Zero-Base Budgeting in Historical and Political Context: Institutionalizing An Old Proposal by unknown
163
Zero-Base Budgeting in Historical and Political
Context: Institutionalizing An Old Proposal
F. TED HEBERT
The University of Oklahoma
The much heralded zero-base budgeting system, a matter of interest
to public administrators and politicians alike, is certainly not a new idea to
students of government budgeting. Its history reaches back almost as far as
the history of American executive budgeting itself. Writing in 1924, just three
years after passage of the Budget and Accounting Act, E. Hilton Young and
N. E. Young describe the start of a British budget cycle as follows:
On October 1 st [the Treasury] sends a circular letter to the officers
responsible for the preparation of the estimates in each civil de-
partment, requesting them to prepare estimates of the departments
in the coming year. There are two stereotyped admonitions in this
circular: one is general, that the state of the public revenue demands
the utmost economy; the other is a particular warning against
assuming last year’s estimates as the starting point for those of the
next. The latter is a necessary warning. It must always be a tempta-
tion to one drawing up an estimate to save himself trouble by taking
last year’s estimate for granted, adding something to any item for
which an increased expenditure is foreseen. Nothing could be easier,
or more wasteful and extravagant. It is in that way that obsolete
expenditure is enabled to make its appearance year after year in
the estimates, long after all reason for it has ceased to be. By this
warning and by the general admonition as to the need for economy
the departments are no doubt duly impressed.1
In a ten year later examination of the budgetary systems of the
United States and of other nations, A. E. Buck quotes the Youngs with
apparent sympathy2 and asks:
... do current or past requirements have any value in [expenditure
estimations]? Undoubtedly so; they are facts which should be re-
garded as elements in the calculation, although they should not be
F. Ted Hebert is Associate Professor of Political Science and Assistant Dean of the
Graduate College at The University of Oklahoma. He received his B. A. from Louisiana Tech
and his M. A. and Ph. D. from The University of lowa. He has been employed by Public
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, the Louisiana state budget office, and since 1969, on
the faculty at Oklahoma.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Central States Conference on
Public Administration, Kansas City, Missouri, November 19-20, 1976.
1E. Hilton Young and N. E. Young, The System of National Finance, 2nd edition
(London: John Murray, 1924), pp. 23-24. Emphasis added.
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accepted as inevitably indicative of future needs and the necessity
for a sustained level of expenditure.3
Although not using the terms &dquo;zero-base budgeting&dquo; (ZBB), these early
authors were calling attention to the very same concern that has captured
the interest of budgetary system reformers today.
ZERO-BASE BUDGETING TODAY
Before undertaking further efforts to trace historical roots of ZBB it
is useful to attempt a description of the recent reforms initiated under that
rubric. Doing so requires examination of efforts made in several state and
local jurisdictions.
The place with which to begin is the State of Georgia. Here Governor
Carter undertook to implement ZBB with the help of Peter A. Pyhrr whose
1970 article in Harvard Business Review is generally credited with sparking
the flames of renewed interest in the approach.4 The objective sought by
the ZBB effort is well stated by George Minmier in his evaluation of
Georgia’s experience: &dquo;Zero-base budgeting is a technique whereby the
total cost of every item included in the proposed budget must be justified
and approved.&dquo;5 This means that items carried forward from previous years
are subject to review just as are new recommendations. This understanding
of ZBB accords well with the desires of the Youngs and of Buck quoted
above, and with a 1969 statement of Arthur F. Burns, now Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, when he said: &dquo;Substantial savings could undoubtedly
be realized if [it were required that] every agency ... make a case for
its entire appropriation request each year, just as if its program or programs
were entirely new.&dquo;6 Pyhrr began his 1970 article with that quotation, clearly
indicating that such was the goal of ZBB as he conceived it.
What remains is to see how the Georgia budgetary system was re-
formed to achieve that goal. Of prime importance was a requirement that
all concerned with the budgetary process begin to focus their attention upon
the activities performed by state agencies, to &dquo;identify the current year’s
activities and operations.&dquo;7 The costs of the activities were to be carefully
3Ibid., p. 175.
4Peter A. Pyhrr, "Zero-Base Budgeting," 48 Harvard Business Review (November-
December, 1970), pp. 111-121.
5George Samuel Minmier, An Evaluation of the Zero-Base Budgeting System in
Governmental Institutions (Atlanta: Georgia State University School of Business Administra-
tion, 1975), p. 10.
6Quoted in Pyhrr, "Zero Base Budgeting," p. 111, from a speech delivered by Mr.
Burns at the Plaza Hotel, New York, December 2, 1969.
7Peter A. Pyhrr, Zero Base Budgeting: A Practical Management Tool for Evaluating
Expenses (New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 12.
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calculated, a procedure which may be new in some governmental units
accustomed to focusing upon objects of expenditure only. Frequently, though,
the activities corresponded with the lowest organizational level within an
agency and cost may thus equal its budget.
The second step which the procedure requires is the formulation of
decision packages identified with each activity. These are of four types:
1. A &dquo;business as usual&dquo; package, supporting both the present means
of performing the activity and the present performance level.
2. A &dquo;different level&dquo; package considering an increase or decrease
in the performance and funding level of the activity.
3. An &dquo;alternative means&dquo; package suggesting a different approach
to the task which the present activity is designed to perform.
4. A &dquo;new activity&dquo; package. This would relate only tangentially,
if at all, to present activities.
Each organizational unit is expected to develop one or more such
decision packages for each activity under its responsibility. Pyhrr suggests
that one package should indicate a &dquo;minimum level of effort&dquo; - the basic
amount of funds and number of employees necessary to keep the activity
functioning, even though failing to meet goals or solve problems for which
it is intended. Additional packages would suggest alternative means or
levels which, added to the minimum level package, would move toward goal
attainment. Each organizational unit, after preparing a justification for each
package, is required to rank its packages from the one most desired, that
which should be funded even in event of the most severe financial constraint,
to that least required, which should be eliminated first if funding levels are
not sufficient.
Although Pyhrr stresses the importance of cost/benefit analysis as a
basis for ranking, he makes few references to any effort to determine the
goals of activities or to measure goal accomplishment.8 This possible short-
coming will be returned to below.
Once an individual unit has ranked its own packages, these are for-
warded to the next higher organizational level where rankings from various
sub-units are consolidated into a department-wide ranking. Finally, these
departmental rankings are submitted to the executive budget office for
consideration. Matters can become highly complex, with thousands of in-
dividual decision packages.9 Various efforts at simplification have been
undertaken including the establishment of a cutoff at, for example, 60%
8Ibid., pp. 62-70.
9Ibid., p. 64.
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of the current budget. There is then no need to review those packages which
fall below that level, and efforts can concentrate on ranking only those
which move to higher funding levels.l° For the 1978 fiscal year, agencies
are instructed to prepare packages at these levels: minimum objective level
(something below current funding); current objective level (service the same
with costs usually somewhat higher); and improvement objective level
(service closer to achieving activity goals). Departments then will rank these
packages. Some activities may find their improvement objective level pack-
ages ranked above the current objective level packages of other activities.
Minmier indicates that in recent years no effort has been made to prepare
a ranking at an organizational level higher than the department 11
To support the rankings, various forms for data presentation have
been developed in Georgia and in other jurisdictions attempting ZBB.12
Although there are obvious differences among these (even within the Georgia
system from year to year), there are significant similarities. One is the in-
clusion of a statement of purpose of the activity. This allows for a brief
narrative description of the goal(s) of the activity. There is a similar space
for a narrative description of the activity itself which is then elaborated
upon by a quantitative presentation of workload data, typically for three
fiscal years. Another important feature of the presentation is a statement
of the consequences which would result from failure to approve the package
- the impact that such failure would have upon goal achievement. This is
accompanied by a brief statement of alternatives which are usually the
subjects of other decision packages. Consequently, from the forms support-
ing any one decision package the reviewer can get a superficial look at the
total consideration given to that activity. Finally, the forms include specific
financial and personnel requests.13
Although this comment is probably more severe than evidence pre-
sented so far justifies, the zero-base budgeting efforts being made today
probably do not deserve to be labeled &dquo;zero-base budgeting.&dquo; Pyhrr’s
sympathetic description of the Georgia system, as well as Minmier’s more
critical examination, leave doubt that any real effort was made to justify
and approve in total every item in the budget. This is not to say that the
reforms may not be important, a matter to be addressed below, but to
10Ibid., pp. 83-86.
11Minmier, op. cit., p. 105.
12Among the ZBB forms examined were those of Georgia, included in Pyhrr, op. cit.,
and in Minmier; those of Wilmington, Delaware, and Garland, Texas.
13Although this description of ZBB is based heavily upon the Georgia experience, it
captures the fundamental features of reforms being promoted generally.
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argue that all activities or programs are considered from zero, that new
proposals have the same chance to be funded (given equal merit) as old
programs is not justified.
What, then, is ZBB all about? If it is not simply a justify from zero&dquo;
effort, what is it? This can best be answered by seeing how it fits into the
development of public budgeting in the United States.
ZERO-BASE BUDGETING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
ZBB: A Secondary Goal of Earlier Reforms
The most complete presentation of earlier reform efforts is found
in Allen Schick’s excellent article, &dquo;The Road to PPB,&dquo; published in 1966.14
Schick maintained that we have seen the emphasis of reform placed, suc-
cessively, upon the control, management, and planning purposes of budget-
ing.l5 Each of these foci was accompanied by a particular budgetary scheme,
object classification budgeting, performance budgeting, and the planning
programming budgeting system, respectively. How orderly matters would
be if one could identify a fourth purpose which the budgetary process might
serve and then proceed to identify ZBB with that purpose. Such is not the
case, however. As shown above, the demand that budget makers justify
from zero reaches back well into the &dquo;control oriented&dquo; period. It was not
totally overlooked during either the &dquo;management&dquo; or the &dquo;planning&dquo;
periods. The thrust of the Hoover Commission recommendation, which was
the capstone of performance emphasis, clearly encompassed an effort to
justify from zero. The following recommendation from the Commission is not
very different from a portion of the Georgia budget process.
Supporting [budgetary] detail submitted initially would include
a narrative explanationf of the significance and scope of each sub-
program - by actiivty or subunit when appropriate - changes in
emphasis over previous years, together with a progress report of
work accomplished or under way. Additional data would be set
forth in tabular form showing comparative work load, unit costs, and
such other yardsticks as might be necessary to evaluate any elements
of the appropriation request. 16
Later, as the focus of reform shited to planning, concern for justifica-
tion from zero persisted. The most noteworthy effort to implement a zero-base
14Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budgetary Reform," 26 Public
Administration Review (December, 1966), pp. 243-258.
15Ibid., pp. 244-45.
16Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, "Budgeting
and Accounting" (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 78. Emphasis
added.
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budget process was undertaken by the Department of Agriculture in
preparation of the 1964 budget. Wildavsky and Hammaiin have provided
an excellent description and evaluation of this exercise. 17 In the USDA
budget preparation instructions, sub-units were told that &dquo;All programs will
be reviewed from the ground up and not merely in terms of changes pro-
posed for the budget year.&dquo;18 This was followed by an effort (not altogether
successful, according to Wildavsky and Hammann) to use these justifications
as a basis for allocating resources.
Still later, the planning programming budgeting system which was
introduced throughout most of the federal government in 1965 clearly de-
manded that budget preparation include consideration of the contribution
which each program (or program component) made to accomplishment of
a specific end or objective.i9 PPB, as implemented by the federal govern-
ment, required that agencies prepare Program Memoranda which provided
a justification for the program in terms of its contribution to a stated objec-
tive. As with ZBB, agencies were told to &dquo;Compare the effectiveness and the
cost ... of alternative types of programs designed to meet the same or
comparable objectives, and of different levels within a given program
category.&dquo;2° These alternatives were to be compared with present programs
for which, of course, complete cost and benefit data would be needed.
Clearly this process required examining total costs and benefits of current
programs, an examination from a zero base. A later instruction told federal
agencies that Program Memoranda should &dquo;be prepared with as much
attention paid to reducing and modifying obsolete and low priority programs
as expanding others and introducing new ones.&dquo;21
The desire to achieve zero-base budgeting, then, has been a motivat-
ing force behind most of the budget reform efforts of the twentieth century.
17Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammond, "Comprehensive Versus Incremental
Budgeting in the Department of Agriculture," 10 Administrative Science Quarterly (December,
1965), pp. 321-346. The correct spelling of the second author’s name is Hammann, but was
spelled incorrectly in the original publication.
18Ibid., p. 326.
19See Melvin Anshen, "The Federal Budget as an Instrument for Management and
Analysis," in David Novick, ed., Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the Federal
Budget (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 3-23. See also other selections in
this excellent volume on PPB.
20Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Bulletin No. 66-3"
(October 12, 1965), as reprinted in Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, Planning Pro-
gramming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management (Chicago, III.: Markham Publishing
Company, 1968), p. 413. Emphasis added.
21Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Supplement to Bulletin
No. 66-3" (February 21, 1966), as reprinted in Lyden and Miller, op. cit., p. 422.
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As Schick correctly indicates, budgets are expected to serve multiple pur-
poses.22 The desire to review ongoing programs from zero, to thereby curtail
or eliminate outdated or non-productive programs, is one of those purposes,
and it has persisted as an objective of governmental budgeting throughout
all the decades of reform. The present ZBB effort is its latest manifestation
and gives it greater emphasis than ever before. Yet, it remains to be seen
whether the current effort can succeed where others have failed, whether
the ZBB scheme as introduced in Georgia is sufficiently different from earlier
reforms to make such success even likely.
The Georgia System and Earlier Reforms
To judge the potential for success of the current ZBB effort, one must
see just how it relates to previous reforms. The brief presentation of the
Georgia scheme given above provides insufficient information for such an
examination, but a slightly more detailed look at certain features will facili-
tate fitting this latest effort into the historical pattern of reform. (While com-
ments here refer specifically to Georgia, they apply equally to other ZBB
efforts that follow Pyhrr’s design.)
A first question to ask is whether ZBB is an extension of the planning
programming budgeting movement. If it were, a significant feature of it
should be heavy emphasis upon the stating of a concrete objective, the
attainment of which is measurable. It was this specification of objectives, and
the formal presentation of the relationships between program activities and
attainment of those objectives, which characterized PPB. A look at Pyhrr’s
description and Minmier’s evaluation of the Georgia system, as well as at
other ZBB efforts, reveals little emphasis upon the ultimate ends which
government programs are designed to serve. Pyhrr devotes one chapter of
his book to specifying the inadequacies of PPB and to showing that ZBB is
capable of filling certain gaps therein. Fundamental to his criticism is a
contention that PPB is designed for long-range planning and provides little
help with short-term decisions, that PPB &dquo;focuses on the effect that a group
of activities has in achieving certain objectives rather than the efficiency in
which each activity is carried out,&dquo; and that PPB focuses primarily upon
new programs or program changes rather than on current programs.23
Certainly Pyhrr is correct. Zero-base budgeting and planning pro-
gramming budgeting are quite distinct systems. Although Pyhrr in several
places stresses the requirement that a ZBB process focus attention upon the
22Allen Schick, Budget Innovation in the States (Washington, D. C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1971), pp. 1-13.
23Pyhrr, op. cit., p. 150.
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benefits of activities, there is little in the Georgia process which facilitates
this. For example, he says that in constructing decision packages, managers
should stress those things which the program accomplishes, being interested
in the &dquo;benefits achieved for a given expenditure.&dquo;24 Elsewhere he says that
each decision package should, at a minimum, provide a cost/benefit
analysis - clearly a focus on program objectives. 2’ However, an examina-
tion of the Georgia budget forms (and, for that matter, forms used in other
ZBB systems) reveals little emphasis on previous statement of objectives or
presentation of cost/benefit analyses. Drawing from an example Pyhrr
presents, a decision package of the Highway Patrol-Field Operation includes
the following Statement of Purpose:
To patrol the rural and public roads and highways throughout the
State, to prevent, detect and investigate criminal acts, and to arrest
and apprehend those charged with criminal offenses appertaining
thereto, and to safeguard the lives and property of the public.26
A package of the Air Quality Laboratory presents the following:
Ambient air laboratory analysis must be conducted for identification
and evaluation of pollutants by type and by volume. Sample analysis
enables engineers to determine effect of control and permits use of
an emergency warning system. 27
Neither of these statements even approaches the degree of precision neces-
sary for a cost/benefit study nor provides higher level decision makers
with a clear understanding of the contribution which the activity makes to a
higher purpose. Even granting that other sections of the form, especially one
headed &dquo;Consequences of Not Approving Package,&dquo; supply some supple-
mentary information, there is still a vast gap between what is provided and
what would be necessary for a precise (quantitative or non-quantitative)
evaluation of the package.
Since Pyhrr has made clear his dissatisfaction with the planning
programming budgeting reform, it is perhaps unfair to evaluate his ZBB
proposal against the criteria for implementation of PPB - especially since
few, if any, PPB efforts met those criteria. One simply needs to discount
Pyhrr’s suggestions that ZBB would permit cost/benefit analysis or really
focus attention upon program accomplishments.
If ZBB is not an extension of the PPB reform, what might it be? One
possibilty is that it is a revival of the earlier marginally successful reform
24Ibid., p. 51.
25Ibid., p. 62.
26Ibid., p. 42.
27Ibid., p. 66.
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effort generally known as &dquo;performance budgeting.&dquo; This, of course, is the
reform Schick associated with a management emphasis in budgeting and
which was promoted by the Hoover Commissions. Under these proposals
there was an effort to lessen the rigidity of control by the executive budget
office and the legislature. Administrators of programs were to gain latitude
to take steps which, it was hoped, would produce greater efficiency. The
desire for efficiency was the driving force behind the performance budgeting
movement.28
To encourage efficiency, budget makers were required to focus atten-
tion upon the activities of their organizations rather than upon the traditional
inputs represented by line items. In the words of Jesse Burkhead, &dquo;Perform-
ance classification provides the link between the things bought and the
things done or accomplished.&dquo;&dquo; He goes on to give examples of &dquo;things
done,&dquo; to include roads built, tons of food transported, acres of trees
planted, tax returns audited or pennies minted.:&dquo;’ Each of these may be
seen as an end product of a government activity.
The next step in performance budgeting was to attach costs to each
of these activities, determining appropriate unit costs. It is here that many
performance budgeting schemes broke down. To establish the full unit cost
required a more elaborate accounting system than most agencies or gov-
ernments had; it required an ability to assign overhead as well as direct
costs to performance units.
Despite this difficulty, many governments in the United States imple-
mented a performance budgeting system, at least in name. A look at the
Budget of the United States today reveals the inclusion of activity measures.
In many cases, though, these innovations were but an overlay upon the
older budgetary process. This author’s experience in the State of Louisiana
may be indicative of widespread practice.
The Louisiana Budget Office in 1965 was employing, in part, a
performance budget. Agencies were required to submit, on the first page of
their budget requests, a statement of purpose and measures of their ac-
tivities. Frequently, the statement of purpose provided was merely a quota-
tion from the statutory authority of the agency. Activity measures were of
the crudest sort and were supplied only by those agencies which had ac-
tivities readily quantifiable. Even more significant is the fact that when the
budget request forms reached the budget office, this author received the
28For a discussion of performance budgeting, see Schick, op. cit., pp. 44-85.
29Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1956), p. 140.
30Ibid., p. 142.
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first page (containing the performance information) while the responsible
budget examiner received the request presented in an object classification.
All decision making from that point on was done through examination of
the object requests. Not until time to print the budget was the performance
information (edited to take up 1/2 page) turned over to a secretary for
typing along with the governor’s recommendation - presented in an object
classification.
Schick’s description of the &dquo;hybridization&dquo; of performance budgeting
in many states accords well with that found in the Louisiana budget system.
There are reasons, then, for severe reservations about &dquo;classification by
activities&dquo; having had any large impact on state or federal budgeting.
As was indicated above, the data employed in ZBB seem to provide
little information about objectives or ends, or the accomplishment of those
objectives. As examples, information required by both the Georgia and the
Garland, Texas, forms is workload information quite similar to that demanded
by performance budgeting. Further, the brief narrative &dquo;statements of pur-
pose&dquo; are quite like the statements which accompanied Louisiana’s per-
formance forms. As an example of activity measures, the Garland instruction
Manual for 1976-77 provides a completed form for a Fleet Maintenance
Center, General Office.31 Workload data are provided for the following:
Work Orders Processed
Mainstem Report Terms
Parts Orders Processed
Parts Issue Transactions
In each case, work unit data are provided for three years.
The Georgia forms have sought to have agencies go one step further,
if possible, and calculate unit cost data and man hour data in relation to
the workload statistics. In both cases, the similarity to the requirements of
performance budgeting schemes is most marked. Even the weaknesses are
similar. Both Pyhrr and Minmier decry the lack of adequate cost information
which is applicable at the activity level.32
This focus upon workload data and upon brief descriptions of the
purposes of activities is so strikingly similar to the performance budgeting
reform that it cannot be overlooked. In both cases there is, it appears, an
assumption that the budgetary process has little to do with the selection of
the objectives of government programs. For both, budgeting is primarily a
31Budget Office, City of Garland, Annual Budget Instrudion Manual, 1976-77 (Gar-
land, Texas : City of Garland, n. d.), p. 23.
32Pyhrr, op. cit., p. 132, and Minmier, op. cit., p. 101 ff.
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process through which an attempt is made to assure that those goals which
are sought are pursued in the most efficient manner. It seems that ZBB may
be a bit more open to consideration of alternative activities for pursuit of
given goals than some formulations of performance budgeting may have
been, but a basic similarity remains. It is the activity which is important to
budget makers and the efficiency with which that activity is carried out.
Despite this obvious similarity, there is a distinction which must be
noted. This distinction could be, if ZBB were to be fully implemented (and
implemented differently from the way it seems to have been so far), more
important than the similarities. It is the feature which proponents of ZBB
talk about most, that budget makers must justify their activities from zero.
Although other reforms have included this demand, none has given it much
emphasis. As best can be told so far, neither does ZBB. The formal require-
ments, the forms, and the results do not indicate any truly concerted effort to
justify activities from zero, let alone every activity every year.33
If ZBB does not really promote justification from zero and seems to
have some of the same weaknesses as performance budgeting, is there any-
thing about it which might justify the attention it is receiving? One possibility
is the fact that ZBB has revived interest in an approach to budgeting which
was suggested in 1952 by Verne B. Lewis and labeled the &dquo;alternative
budget system.&dquo;34 Lewis explicitly declined to suggest the mechanism through
which his approach to budgeting might be implemented but did describe
the system’s major features. Each preparer of a budget would be required
to consider the services which could be provided at, perhaps, five different
funding levels. These levels might be varied to take account of particular
situations, but would adhere to the general pattern. At each level the
&dquo;nature, quantity, and quality of services&dquo; which the agency could provide
would be specified.35 Each higher administrative level would have opportu-
nity to review the alternatives. The highest levels, and even the legislature,
would have access to a group of alternatives.36
A slight variation of the alternative budget scheme was suggested in
1971 by Merewitz and Sosnick. They proposed that three. levels of funding
might be sufficient. These levels would provide, in comparison to the present
year, &dquo;the same-dollar amount,&dquo; &dquo;the same-prformance amount,&dquo; and &dquo;the
33On the impact of ZBB upon budgets see Minmier, op. cit., pp. 118 ff and 154.
34Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," 12 Public Administration Review
(Winter, 1952), pp. 42-54.
35Ibid., p. 49.
36Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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recommended amounts Justifications, including quantitative supporting
data if available, would be provided for the recommended amount and to
support conclusions regarding the impact which would result from funding
at the alternative levels. Higher administrative units would consolidate these
reports into alternatives similarly defined, but covering the entire higher
level agency. Additionally, the higher level request would indicate the dis-
tribution of funds which would be made to subordinate agencies. For
example, if the department received the same-performance amount, some of
the lower agencies might get as much as or more than their recommended
amounts while others could get less than their same-dollar amounts. The
process would compel budget reviewers to consider such trade-offs.38
Merewitz and Sosnick comment:
The alternative budget approach... has important advantages
over zero-base budgeting. Both procedures encourage officials to
consider curtailing or terminating ineffective or obsolete programs.
The alternative budget approach, however, does not throw away
information about last year’s appropriation and does not demand
justifications that cannot be given. It recognizes that what is the best
allocation of funds is a matter of judgment, and it seeks to provide
decision-makers with the information needed to pass judgment. This
information consists of a description of what would be gained in
one program and lost in another if funds were reallocated.39
This descripiton of the alternative budget system does not differ
markedly in some of its features from the ZBB system as proposed by Pyhrr.
In fact, the ZBB procedures implemented in Georgia and elsewhere can be
seen as an effort to institutionalize an alternative budget system in combina-
tion with important features of performance budgeting. Admittedly, the
focusing of attention at the activity level (perhaps lower than Lewis or
Merewitz and Sosnick had in mind) is an important variation of alternative
budgeting. However, doing so ties this recent reform more closely to the
performance budget approach. It is at the activity level that there are likely
to be countable work units to which costs can be attached. Decisions under
the ZBB system are apparently to be made in terms of the impact which
various funding levels, represented by the decision packages, have upon
performance of the activities and, especially, upon the accomplishment of
units of work.
37Leonard Merewitz and Stephen H. Sosnick, The Budget’s New Clothes: A Critique
of Planning-Programming-Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis (Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company, 1971), p. 66.
38Ibid., pp. 68 and 69.
39Ibid., p. 70.
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What is new in ZBB is not the goal or focus of budgeting but rather
it is the concerted effort to institutionalize earlier reform proposals. By
requiring the presentation of performance information and by requiring the
preparation of decision packages which are comparable to alternatives,
ZBB establishes procedures which compel decision makers to consider issues
and data frequently overlooked. The ranking process, even if not adhered
to rigidly, at least focuses attention upon possible effects which funding
decisions may have. The effects are not, however, stated precisely in terms
of achieving objectives. Compared to an ideal of PPB, the ZBB system stops
far short of addressing the attainment of objectives. It does facilitate con-
sideration of the efficient conduct of activities and of a possible trade-off
between one activity and another.
As with efforts to implement performance budgeting, the accumula-
tion of cost and activity data is limited. Although Pyhrr gives assurance that,
once in place, the ZBB systems should not add significantly to time and
money costs of budgeting, there can be little doubt that assembling the
data required for full implementation would be costly indeed.
In addition to these money costs, there are important political costs
of ZBB implementation. These can be suggested by examining the political
history of the earlier reforms which ZBB seems to encompass. In addition to
fitting into an historical context, the emergence of ZBB at this particular
time - after its having been around for at least 50 years - is of political
significance.
ZERO-BASE BUDGETING IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
No examination of political considerations associated with budgetary
reform would be complete without reference to the work of Aaron
Wildavsky.4° His description of the politics of the budgetary process pro-
vides the base from which to begin a discussion of reform proposals. That
description unabashedly admitted that public budgeting is a political matter
and, further, Wildavsky judged that it ought to be political. He recognized
that the budgetary process itself, as well as the decisional outputs of that
process, are influenced by partisan considerations, by interest groups and
by strategies devised by participants and, further, that the process and
outputs should be so influenced.41
Any attempt to reform the process will succeed or fail, in part, on
the basis of how well its proponents recognize the political forces at work
40Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 1st edition (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1964).
41Mention should be made of one earlier work which did show sensitivity to political
considerations, that of Burkhead cited above.
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and design the reform to gain sufficient support. One of the difficulties with
which the current ZBB reforms must contend is the still present negative
reaction to the earlier PPB reform effort. As a means of considering the
effect of this as well as other political matters, it is helpful to look at the
politics of earlier reforms.
According to Schick, the performance budgeting movement which
caught on after World War II was really an extension of pre-war develop-
ments. Attention had been diverted by the war, but at its close energies
could be used to implement reforms which had been discussed by students
of public administration during the 1930s. Of special importance was the
focus upon work units which grew quite naturally from the scientific manage-
ment movement.42 This concern, coupled with the post-war desire to assure
efficiency in public spending (a matter of little interest during the war years),
combined to produce a receptive political environment for performance
budgeting. This environment was at least hospitable for a discussion of per-
formance budgeting. It may have been less hospitable for its actual imple-
mentation.
Schick points out that there was no real urgency to budgeting reform
in the early 1950s; neither the general public nor public administrators felt
there was a crisis that might be resolved through changes in budgetary
procedures. There was a general concern over rising government spending
but that did not necessarily suggest sweeping changes in budgetary prac-
tices.43 Neither executives nor legislatures stood to enhance their political
strengths through adoption of performance budgeting. Neither would gain
markedly, as the executive may have gained with adoption of the executive
budget system thirty years earlier.44 This time many participants simply did
not see the value in institutionalization of the reforms. Obviously, if one set
of participants (the legislature, for example) had decided that there was
much to gain, there would have been a willingness to commit political
capital, to engage in a struggle to insure true implementation and thus
reap the benefits. This did not occur. Implementations were partial, at best,
and were usually simple overlays upon traditional budgeting. The traditional
pattern of bargaining over incremental changes in line-items remained the
major pattern.
In describing the political considerations which may have influenced
the adoption or rejection of PPB, Schick explains the benefits which various
participants gain from preservation of the traditional process. With regard
42Schick, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
43Ibid., p. 63-64.
44Ibid., p. 64.
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to the preparers of budgets, the spending agencies, Schick notes that the
proposed reforms would have inhibited the agencies’ abilities to &dquo;sell&dquo; their
programs. The agencies generally prefer a subjective evaluation process
within which they can make use of interest group and clientele support as
defenses of funding. With line-item budgeting, agencies find it easier to
manipulate the facts to their advantage. 15 Lest one immediately react
negatively to such an explanation for the rejection of budget reform, note
that Wildavsky defends such subjective techniques as both simplifying de-
vices and as means of assuring input of various political interests. Frequently,
matters to be decided are of such great complexity that a reviewer will not
have the technical expertise to make a decision based on a presentation of
material which seeks to justify a total program. He or she simply will not
be able to comprehend and to consider all implications of major program
changes.
In defending incremental decision making as a means of furthering
representation, Wildavsky treats favorably a partial-view-of-the-public-in-
terest in which, through the budgetary process, various participants contend
heatedly, each defending their own interests, with no one participant trying
to take into consideration the interests of all groups in society. No preparer
of a program and no reviewer is required to think of himself or herself as
speaking for some vague public will. The competition and struggle en-
gendered by each agency and each interest group seeking its own advan-
tages are seen as appropriate. 46
Earlier reforms did not dramatically alter the general nature of
budgetary politics. With regard to central budget offices, Schick notes
that their prime responsibility is budget cutting. This persists despite earlier
reform efforts. These earlier efforts have attempted to force the budget
cutters to consider the impacts their cuts have upon activities or programs.
Such a demand has greatly complicated the task of the budget cutters and
made them resistant to reforms.47 Wildavsky notes that precise cutting of
specific programs demands far greater knowledge than the budget cutters
usually have.48 Further, it demands that the budget cutters be explicit about
the activities or programs which will not be funded. The possibility of simply
eliminating a small percentage of total budget from many programs (a
meat-axe approach) is precluded. Reformers assume that analyses have a
high degree of precision, perhaps higher than can be provided. In short,
45Ibid., pp. 172-173.
46Wildovsky, op. cit., pp. 165-167.
47Schick, op. cit., pp. 173-177.
48Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 148.
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the tasks of budget cutters are complicated by performance budget or PPB
type reforms.
The legislative branch can be considered somewhat similar to other
budget cutters. Certainly it plays a cutting role and is benefitted in the
same way by traditional techniques. Further, however, the traditional tech-
niques provide the line-items which are important simplifying devices to many
legislators. As generalists (with the exception of certain committee mem-
bers) the legislators would have little basis for detailed consideration of
fundamental program changes. Complexities of programs are frequently so
great that no legislator can thoroughly understand all aspects of the process
by which a particular activity leads to an accepted objective. Simplifying
devices are important. Looking at and questioning sharp growth in personnel
costs or in travel expenses can afford the legislator an opportunity to elicit
responses from agency representatives and to probe more deeply if neces-
sary. It might seem ideal for a legislator to vote directly upon the imple-
mentation of a major new treatment modality at a state institution, but his
or her understanding of the implications of that change would be sharply
limited. Little would be gained over noting the associated increase in per-
sonnel expenses and, perhaps, compelling the agency to absorb some of
these increases through attrition in other activities.
With all of these factors operating against earlier reforms, perfor-
mance budgeting and PPB, it is not erribly surprising that neither was widely
accepted despite partial implementation by many governmental units.4~
But what of ZBB? Is there reason to expect its acceptance?
Zero-Base Budgeting in Washington
To this point most references have been to ZBB systems that have
been in place for several years. It is appropriate, though, that a few com-
ments be made on the federal government’s ZBB system, presently being
implemented.
Most important, the federal system varies little from that of Georgia.
In a memorandum dated February 14, 1977, President Carter stated that,
&dquo;A zero-base budgeting system permits a detailed analysis and justification
of budget requests by an evaluation of the importance of each operation
performed.&dquo; He instructed the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to issue revised procedures incorporating ZBB techniques.
Under federal ZBB (as under other systems), agencies are required
to specify decision units - &dquo;the program or organizational entity for which
49Schick concludes that these political factors seem to have produced less resistance
to PPB than to performance budgeting.
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a manager makes significant decisions on the amount of spending and the
scope or quality of work to be performed.&dquo;5I) For each of these decision
units there is a set of decision packages, each of which is a &dquo;brief justifica-
tion document that includes the information necessary for managers to
make judgments on program or activity levels and resource requirements.&dquo;.51
Application of these features can be shown by a couple of examples.
Guidance distributed within the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment listed sixty-one decision units including &dquo;payments for operation of low
income housing projects,&dquo; &dquo;urban renewal grants,&dquo; &dquo;community development
grants,&dquo; and &dquo;housing counseling assistance.&dquo; Some of these are consoli-
dations of other, lower level, decision units. Following OMB guidance, it is
required that there be for each unit a minimum level decision package - a
request for the minimum amount of funds, for support at a level below which
it would not be feasible or practical to continue the program or activity.
Second, there is to be a current level package, indicating funds needed to
continue the present level of activity through the budget year; it is recognized
that such continuance might require more funds than provided at present.
Finally there can be an improved level package, indicating the manager’s
recommended level of activity and associated costs.
These packages are supported by brief justification statements - and
it is required that they be brief, normally limited to two pages. 52 Statements
of goals and objectives (as shown in instructional examples of OMB and
several agencies) are quite general. In Bulletin 77-9, OMB provided the
following example for a community mental health grant program.
Goal: To ensure needy citizens access to community based mental
health services, regardless of ability to pay. Services should be of
high quality, provided in the least restrictive environment, and in a
manner assuring patients’ rights and dignity.
Objective: To assist in the establishment and operation of a nation-
wide network of 1,200 qualified community mental health centers
(CMHCs) by 1984 to ensure availability and accessibility of services
to residents of each mental health catchment area.
In its instructions, HUD used the following example:
Goal: Provide decent housing.
Objective: Over the next five years approve grants for construction
of 70,000 units of multi-family housing in 30-units and 40-unit
structures.
50Office of Management and Budget, Bulletin No. 77-9, April 19, 1977, p. 1.
51Ibid., p. 1.
52Joel Havemann, "Zero-Base Budgeting," 9 National Journal (April 2, 1977), p. 517.
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As in Georgia, little emphasis is placed on systematic evaluation of pro-
gram contributions to any goals or objectives that are more general
than those most obviously associated with the program. Also as in Georgia,
instructions place little emphasis upon seriously considering program or
activity elimination. Such might happen as a result of the ranking process,
but the possibility does not receive major attention.&dquo;
Conclusion
If the description of ZBB presented above is accurate and if what
is occurring is an effort to institutionalize a combination of performance
budgeting and alternative budgeting, there is ample reason to question
whether ZBB will be widely accepted (in more than in name) and will have
any truly marked impact upon the budgetary process. There may be, how-
ever, some features about public attitudes today which could facilitate
implementation. We have witnessed the election of a Presidential candidate
who campaigned as an outsider to Washington and as a strong supporter
of ZBB. While it is doubtful that his specific support for ZBB contributed
greatly to his victory, his more general criticism of &dquo;Washington bureaucrats&dquo;
may have helped, especially in the primaries. There may exist a reservoir
of public support for a concerted effort to reduce government programs and
employment and, hence, to support a budgetary scheme which purports to
facilitate that. On the other hand, economic considerations will probably
prevent sharp curtailment of either government spending or employment.
Any results from immediate implementation of a ZBB system would need
to be demonstrated through the transferring of resources among activities.
Such results would be difficult to communicate to the public, and support
for ZBB might be short lived.
If there may be support from the public, it is doubtful that much
support will be found among participants in the budgetary process. The
memory of PPB is still fresh and many agencies have continued to improve
upon their cost/benefit studies and program evaluations. Of course, the
federal budget process already includes activity measurements. What can
be added would be the formal presentation of alternatives in the form of
decision packages. Unlike Georgia, many federal agencies have available
fairly adequate data bases for creation of supporting documentation. The
particular forms employed would need to be far more elaborate than those
used in Georgia to take advantage of such data. The complexity imposed
upon reviewers would be many times larger.
53See this author’s letter and Peter Pyhrr’s response in 37 Public Administration
Review (July/August, 1977), pp. 438-439. See also Donald F. Haider, "Zero Base ; Federal
State," 37 Public Administration Review (July/August, 1977), pp. 400-407.
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On the legislative side, Congress is still implementing its own new
budgetary process. One must doubt that there will be much enthusiasm
from members or staff for an extensive revision of executive budget pro-
cedures.
At the federal level, then, despite some possible support from the
public, it seems doubtful that ZBB will make any real headway. The likely
gain for various participants does not seem great enough to justify elimina-
tion of the traditional process and modification of the remnants of PPB to
accord with the demands of ZBB.
In state and local governments a flurry of activity labeled &dquo;imple-
mentation of ZBB&dquo; continues. Although there is a general familiarity
with the Georgia system, many of these governmental units may
be devising their own procedures and, in fact, may be taking more literally
the &dquo;justify from zero&dquo; prescription. For example, Oklahoma City, after
examining the various attempts being made in Georgia and elsewhere,
elected to simply instruct agencies to provide justifications from zero for
twenty-five percent of their operations. Few additional instructions were
supplied, although Budget Office staff members consulted with the agencies.
What will result from such an unstructed process is difficult to determine.
No doubt, there will be wide variation in the justification efforts
One fact is clear. The data problems encountered by Georgia are
likely to be fairly common among state and local governments. It is significant
that Georgia encountered problems even though the data requirements
were quite minimal. Whether budget participants in state and local govern-
ments can justify the investment of time and money to meet even the level
demanded by the Georgia system remains to be determined.
Zero-base budgeting, then, is something other than what the name
implies, and probably less than what the name implies if the Georgia system
is taken as the archetype. ZBB is an attempt to institutionalize a combina-
tion of older proposals for budget reform. This would be an accurate
description, of course, even if actual justification from zero were required.
Does this conclusion make the ZBB effort any less significant? Not neces-
sarily, but it does place upon the proponents of ZBB a responsibility to
demonstrate that (1) there have been political changes which now make
institutionalization possible or (2) that the failure of earlier efforts resulted
from improper approaches to institutionalization rather than from weak-
nesses inherent in the reform proposals themselves.
54I am indebted to the staff of the Oklahoma City Budget Office and its Director
Joe Clytus for the use of their library and numerous conversations during the course of
preparing this paper.
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